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In this study, I examine three issues: (1) whether the probability of bank failure is increasing in 
the proportion of regulatory capital composed of deferred tax assets (DTA), (2) whether market 
participants incorporate the increased failure risk associated with the DTA component of capital 
into their assessments of credit risk, and (3) whether the rules governing the inclusion of DTA 
into capital encourage risk-taking behavior. Using a sample of U.S. commercial banks, I find that 
banks that had a larger proportion of capital composed of DTA at the beginning of the recent 
recession were more likely to fail during the recession, even after controlling for other 
determinants of bank failure. Furthermore, using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies, I 
find that banks with a larger percentage of regulatory capital composed of DTA have lower 
credit ratings and higher bond spreads, with the effect varying negatively with expected 
profitability. Finally, I find evidence that poorly capitalized banks increased risk-taking to count 
more DTA towards capital requirements. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate 
regarding the inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital, as well as the literatures examining the 
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This study investigates the credit risk associated with the deferred tax asset (“DTA”) 
component of bank regulatory capital (hereafter “DTA capital”). Banks are required to maintain 
certain levels of regulatory capital to provide a buffer against losses (Kim and Santomero 1988; 
Ryan 2007; Baesens and van Gestel 2009). In the United States, banks are permitted to count a 
portion of their DTA towards regulatory capital requirements. However, the benefits associated 
with DTA can be realized only when the bank earns taxable income, so when banks experience 
tax losses the DTA lose value. Since DTA capital loses value precisely when the bank needs 
capital to offset losses, it represents a potentially fragile buffer against these losses. 
Consistent with this line of thinking, there is an ongoing debate regarding the 
appropriateness of including DTA in the regulatory capital calculation.
1,2
 Throughout the recent 
financial crisis, major media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg routinely 
drew attention to banks‟ DTA positions, noting their large size relative to total assets and 
portraying them as tenuous contributions towards regulatory capital.
3
 A January 28, 2009 
Bloomberg article noted that tier 1 capital ratios contain “fluff” and mentioned DTA as a primary 
culprit, calling it an “airy asset” because its reliance on future profitability (Reilly 2009). 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision specifically targeted the DTA component 
of capital as a potential method for improving the ability of regulatory capital to protect banks 
from losses, as well as the accuracy and timeliness of capital ratios as measures of credit risk. In 
its December 2009 consultative document entitled “Strengthening the resilience of the banking 
                                                     
1
 I use DTA to refer to both the singular (a deferred tax asset) and the plural (deferred tax assets). 
2
 I use the terms capital and regulatory capital interchangeably.  
3
 Wall Street Journal articles on DTA and regulatory capital: “Estimates of Losses on Banks‟ Tax Assets Rattle 
Investors”, October 30, 2009; “Deutsche Bank‟s lingering capital conundrum”, February 4, 2010; “Tax Assets: Here 
Today, Gone Tomorrow?”, April 10, 2010; “Banks Gain in Rules Debate”, July 15, 2010. Bloomberg articles on 
DTA and regulatory capital: “Citigroup‟s „Capital‟ Was All Casing, No Meat”, November 24, 2008; “Citi, BofA 
Show Investors Can‟t Bank on Capital”, January 28, 2009. 
3 
 
sector”, the Basel Committee proposed disallowing all DTA from regulatory capital. In its 
recommendation, it noted that: 
 
“Undue reliance on these assets is not appropriate for prudential purposes, as they may provide 
no protection to depositors or governmental deposit insurance funds in insolvency and can be 
suddenly written off in a period of stress.” 
 
At the same time, the banking industry has pushed for greater inclusion of DTA in the 
regulatory capital calculation. In a September 25, 2009 letter to several regulatory agencies, the 
American Bankers Association and the Clearing House urged these regulatory agencies to revisit 
the guidelines limiting the inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital.
4
 Their reasoning for revisiting 
the guidelines was based in part on the banks‟ increased experience with DTA accounting since 
SFAS No. 109 was adopted in 1992 (specifically the establishment of valuation allowances) and 
the notion that regulators should treat banks as going concerns. Given the substantial overhaul of 
financial regulations underway by both the U.S. government and the Basel Committee, the 
inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital is likely to come under more scrutiny. However, to date 
there have been no studies on the DTA component of regulatory capital in the United States. 
Specifically, while plenty of opinions exist, no one has examined whether DTA capital in fact 
represents a fragile buffer against losses.  
This study attempts to fill this gap in the academic literature and inform the debate 
regarding DTA capital by examining whether the probability of bank failure is related to the 
level of DTA capital. The recent financial crisis demonstrated the potential for bank failures to 
                                                     
4
 The letter was sent to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. It can be found online at 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/DC65CE12-B1C7-11D4-AB4A-00508B95258D/62693/090925DTA.pdf 
[Accessed March 7, 2012] 
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affect both the financial sector and the economy as a whole. Regulators are likely to focus their 
efforts to revamp the bank system on reducing the probability of future bank failures. Capital 
requirements are intended to regulate banks‟ ability to absorb losses and thus the probability of 
insolvency (Kim and Santomero 1988; Ryan 2007; Baesens and van Gestel 2009). Thus, 
examining whether a component of capital is associated with the likelihood of bank failure is 
likely to be of interest to regulators. 
I examine three questions in this study: (1) whether the probability of bank failure is 
increasing in the proportion of capital composed of DTA, (2) whether market participants 
incorporate this increased risk of failure into their assessments of credit risk, and (3) whether the 
rules governing the inclusion of DTA into capital actually encourage risk-taking behavior. 
To test whether the proportion of regulatory capital composed of DTA is positively 
associated with the probability of bank failure, I employ a sample of large U.S. commercial 
banks and examine whether the proportion of capital composed of DTA at the beginning of the 
recent financial crisis is positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the crisis. I find 
that, even after controlling for other potential determinants of bank failures, the risk of failure 
during the crisis is increasing in the proportion of capital composed of DTA. 
Second, I investigate whether two market participants, credit ratings agencies and bond 
market investors, incorporate the increased probability of failure associated with DTA capital 
when assessing credit risk. To test this hypothesis, I use a sample of large U.S. bank holding 
companies and two measures of credit risk: the Standard & Poor‟s credit rating and the spread 
between the yield on the bank‟s bonds and government securities of similar maturity. I estimate 
the relation between each credit risk proxy and the proportion of regulatory capital made up of 
DTA. I find that, even after controlling for the overall level of capital and other previously 
documented determinants of credit risk, bank holding companies with a higher percentage of 
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regulatory capital composed of DTA have lower credit ratings and higher bond spreads, 
supporting the notion that market participants understand that banks that rely more heavily on 
DTA capital have more credit risk. Furthermore, I find that the credit risk associated with DTA 
capital varies predictably with expected future profitability. 
Finally, I examine whether the rules governing the inclusion of DTA into regulatory 
capital may have incentivized poorly capitalized banks to increase risk-taking (Shackelford et al. 
2010; Shackelford et al. 2011). In the United States, some DTA are only allowed to be counted 
as regulatory capital if they are expected to be realized within the next twelve months.
5
 For 
banks looking to raise capital ratios, including more DTA into capital may have been a low cost 
alternative to issuing new equity or debt. To include additional DTA into capital, banks would 
have to convince regulators and auditors that the DTA were likely to be realized in the next 
twelve months. Banks could accomplish this by making risky investments, since the large 
expected payoffs that accompany risky investments would provide income against which the 
DTA could be realized. To test this hypothesis, I examine whether current changes in the amount 
of DTA included in capital are positively associated with future changes in risk. A positive 
association would support the notion that banks made risky investments in order to justify 
including more DTA into capital, and that the outcomes of the increased risk-taking manifested 
in later periods. Using a sample of U.S. bank holding companies, I find that current increases in 
the amount of DTA included in capital are positively associated with future changes in equity 
volatility and nonperforming loans, but only for poorly capitalized banks. These results support 
the idea that poorly capitalized banks increased risk-taking to boost capital ratios through the 
inclusion of additional DTA. 
                                                     
5
 This limitation only applies to the DTA that derive their benefits from future taxable income. Additionally, banks 
are also limited in the total proportion of capital that can be composed of DTA dependent on future taxable income. 
The rules governing the inclusion of DTA into capital are discussed in detail in Section II. 
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Overall, my study contributes to the ongoing debate regarding the appropriateness of the 
inclusion of DTA in tier 1 capital. The evidence in this study is consistent with the position of 
the Basel Committee, which criticizes the inclusion of DTA in capital based on its inability to 
satisfy claims against the bank during times of poor performance. However, despite this evidence 
regulators may have incentives to continue allowing DTA to be counted as capital. When a bank 
experiences extreme negative returns, the losses erode the bank‟s capital. However, those losses 
also create DTA in the form of tax loss carryforwards. If DTA are included in capital, then they 
provide a boost to capital ratios precisely when the bank needs it most. This is a form of 
regulatory forbearance; the appearance of high capital ratios allows regulators to forgo 
intervention and instead wait for the bank‟s performance to improve.
6
 This is not unique to the 
United States; for example, Skinner (2008) concludes that Japanese regulators simultaneously 
created DTA accounting and included DTA in the regulatory capital calculation to boost bank 
capital ratios in the late 1990s. However, my results suggest that rules governing the inclusion of 
DTA into capital incentivized poorly capitalized banks to increase risk-taking at inopportune 
times, possibly hindering the ability to recover without regulatory intervention. Accordingly, 
regulators should carefully re-examine whether the inclusion of DTA into capital and the related 
guidelines are appropriate. 
This study also contributes to the literature on the relation between capital and risk. Most 
prior studies that examine regulatory capital and credit risk focus on either the total capital ratio 
or the denominator (Koehn and Santomero 1980; Kim and Santomero 1988; Shrieves and Dahl 
1992; Aggarwal and Jacques 2001; Rime 2001). These studies implicitly assume that the 
components of regulatory capital are homogenous and do not lose value. However, regulatory 
capital is composed of a variety of assets, including DTA which can lose value when the bank 
                                                     
6
 Regulators may also want to include DTA into capital to encourage timely loan loss recognition, since loan loss 




fails to earn positive taxable income. My results suggest that capital components should be 
considered individually when examining the ability to absorb losses and reduce failure risk. 
Finally, my study contributes to the literature on the valuation of DTA, which has previously 
focused on equity investors (Amir et al. 1997; Amir and Sougiannis 1999; Guenther and Sansing 
2000; De Waegenaere et al. 2003). I extend this literature by examining how credit market 
participants value DTA. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the extant 
literature on the valuation of DTA and the association between regulatory capital and risk. This 
section also covers institutional details, including the rules that govern the inclusion of DTA in 
regulatory capital. Section III presents the hypotheses, and Section IV describes the research 
design. Section V explains the sample selection process and provides descriptive statistics. 
Section VI discusses the empirical results. Section VII concludes the study. 
 
II. PRIOR LITERATURE AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
Literature on DTA valuation 
 Since the adoption of SFAS No. 109 in 1992, researchers have provided mixed 
predictions as to how market participants view DTA. Amir and Sougiannis (1999) point out that 
DTA represent future tax benefits and thus should be positively valued (the measurement effect). 
On the other hand, they also note that DTA may have implications for the perception of the firm 
as a going concern (the information effect). Specifically, if DTA arise from past operating losses, 
market participants may perceive the firm to be risky, likely to incur future losses, and 
potentially unable to realize the future tax benefits from its DTA. 
Several studies address the value relevance of DTA for equity market participants. 
Guenther and Sansing (2000) and De Waegenaere et al. (2003) analytically examine the equity 
8 
 
market valuation of DTA and tax loss carryforwards, respectively. Amir et al (1997) use a 
variant of the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) framework to empirically investigate how DTA are 
valued by investors, finding evidence of both the measurement and information effects. Amir 
and Sougiannis (1999) examine how equity analysts and investors incorporate information 
regarding a specific source of deferred taxes, tax carryforwards, into earnings forecasts and share 
prices. The authors find evidence supporting both the measurement and information effects. 
Specifically, they find that analysts consider the earnings of firms with tax carryforwards to be 
less persistent, consistent with the idea that the presence of tax carryforwards is a signal about 
the potential for future losses. Furthermore, the authors find that equity investors value the tax 
loss carryforwards as assets, consistent with the notion that they will provide future tax benefits. 
Instead of focusing on equity investors and analysts, I examine how credit market 
participants, specifically bond market investors and credit rating agencies, value DTA. Also in 
contrast with these studies, I examine the valuation of the portion of DTA included for regulatory 
capital purposes. 
 
Literature on regulatory capital and risk 
Prior studies have arrived at inconsistent conclusions as to whether changing capital 
requirements leads to an increase or decrease in a bank‟s credit risk. Shrieves and Dahl (1992) 
and Duffie and Singleton (2003) model a bank shareholder‟s incentives using an options pricing 
framework (increasing risk raises share values). Here, capital requirements mitigate a bank 
shareholder‟s tendency to „gamble‟ at low capital levels. The capital requirement forces the 
bank‟s shareholder to internalize some of the losses caused by risky investments, which in turn 
causes the shareholder to lower the risk of his investments and thus the bank‟s credit risk. 
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However, several studies show that increasing capital requirements can lead to an 
increase in credit risk. Koehn and Santomero (1980) analytically demonstrate that the probability 
of bankruptcy may be increasing the capital requirement, since the bank may respond to 
increases in the capital level by shifting to riskier assets. A follow up study, Kim and Santomero 
(1988), notes that the result from Koehn and Santomero (1980) is driven by the assumption that 
capital requirements do not consider asset risk. They show that the regulatory agency can obtain 
the desired probability of bankruptcy by requiring an optimal level of capital be held for each 
asset type, with the optimal level being a function of the asset‟s risk. These studies are primarily 
concerned with the association between the overall capital ratio and the denominator (total assets 
versus risk-weighted assets) and risk. 
Empirical studies on the association between regulatory capital and risk generally 
consider the overall capital ratio rather than components of the numerator (capital). Shrieves and 
Dahl (1992) document a positive relation between changes in capital and changes in risk, 
suggesting that higher levels of capital may be associated with increased credit risk. On the other 
hand, Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) find that the implementation of the Prompt Corrective 
Action provision of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which 
implemented more stringent capital requirements, caused banks to decrease their level of risk. 
Consistent with Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Bologna (2011) finds that banks with higher 
regulatory capital were less likely to fail during the 2008 financial crisis. Rime (2001) studies the 
banking industry in Switzerland and documents no relation between changes in capital and 
changes in risk. My study differs from these studies in that it examines the association between a 
specific component of regulatory capital and credit risk. Ng and Roychowdhury (2011) also 
examine a specific component of regulatory capital (loan loss reserves) and demonstrate that 
banks which included loan loss reserves in tier 2 capital were more likely to fail during the recent 
10 
 
financial crisis. However, this study differs in that I examine a component tier 1 capital, whereas 
Ng and Roychowdhury (2011) examine a component of tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital components 
are supposed to provide a stronger buffer against losses than tier 2 components, which is the 
reason that at least half of total bank capital must be in the form of tier 1 capital. My study 
contributes to the literature by examining a component of the numerator (capital) rather than the 
overall ratio or denominator, specifically one that can lose its value during times of distress. 
 
Bank regulation in the United States 
This study uses two different types of financial institutions: bank holding companies and 
commercial banks. The former are regulated by the Federal Reserve, while the latter are 
regulated by either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (OCC), or the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Each regulator‟s mission 
includes monitoring bank operations in order to protect the banking system.
7
 Specifically, one 
regulatory objective is to ensure financial institutions have the ability to absorb certain levels of 
losses. This is accomplished by requiring banks to maintain certain levels of capital. Regulators 
monitor bank capital levels through quarterly reports. If a financial institution is unable to 
maintain specified capital levels, the regulator can take actions which can include closing and 
liquidating the institution. 
Capital ratios represent a tool for assessing the soundness of financial institutions 
(Estrella et al. 2000). The primary measure is the tier 1 capital ratio, which is tier 1 capital 
divided by total risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 capital is calculated by making a series of 
adjustments to bank common equity.
8
 To arrive at the denominator of the ratio (risk-weighted 
                                                     
7
 For example, the Federal Reserve System states as one of its responsibilities “supervising and regulating banking 
institutions to ensure the safety and soundness of the nation‟s banking and financial system 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/faq/faqfrs.htm). 
8
 The tier 1 capital calculation on the form FR Y-9C is presented in Appendix A. 
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assets), a bank multiplies each of its assets by a risk weight. For example, U.S. government 
bonds generally receive a risk weight of zero, meaning the bank is not required to hold any 
capital in reserve for government bonds. However, most bank assets receive the maximum risk 
weight (100 percent). Thus, adding risky assets (such as mortgages or commercial loans) to the 
bank‟s balance sheet will require additional capital should the bank desire to maintain the same 
tier 1 ratio, whereas buying assets with a zero risk weight (such as riskless bonds) does not 
require any additional capital. 
 
Rules governing inclusion of DTA in regulatory capital 
In October 1995, the OCC adopted the criteria that currently govern the inclusion of DTA 
in capital. Appendix A shows portions of the Form FR Y-9C and accompanying instructions that 
contain the regulatory capital calculations. The inclusion of DTA into regulatory capital is 
partially governed by accounting standards. SFAS No. 109 allows firms to record DTA to the 
extent that they will be realized in future periods, and requires a valuation allowance to be 
recognized if “on the weight of the available evidence, it is more likely than not that some 
portion or all of the deferred tax asset will not be realized” (FASB, 1992). A bank reports its 
gross DTA, gross deferred tax liabilities (“DTL”), and valuation allowance in its financial 
statements. However, not all of the DTA from the financial statements are allowed as part of 
regulatory capital. Specifically, banks are only allowed to count part of their DTA that are 
dependent upon future taxable income.
9
 The amount of DTA dependent upon future taxable 
income allowed in capital is limited to the lesser of: (1) the amount of such DTA the bank 
expects to recognize within one year of the quarter-end report based on its projection of future 
                                                     
9
 According to the instructions to the Form FR Y-9C, DTA that are dependent upon future taxable income are (a) 
DTA arising from deductible temporary differences that exceed the amount of taxes previously paid that a bank 
holding company could recover through loss carrybacks if the bank holding company‟s temporary differences (both 




taxable income, or (2) ten percent of the amount of the bank‟s adjusted tier 1 capital.
10
 Banks 
generally report either a net DTA or net DTL position and the amount of DTA excluded from the 




III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
In this study, I test three hypotheses. First, I examine whether banks that have a larger 
proportion of capital composed of DTA are more likely to fail. I focus on the DTA component of 
regulatory capital because, unlike other capital components (such as commercial loans or trading 
assets), DTA lose almost all of their value when the bank does not make a profit since they 
derive their benefit from future taxable income. As a result, DTA cannot be used to satisfy 
claims against the bank when it incurs losses. This is the primary argument of regulators: that 
DTA capital offers “no protection to depositors or governmental deposit insurance funds” in 
times of poor performance (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009). Therefore, holding 
the overall capital level and other factors constant, banks that have a greater proportion of their 
capital composed of DTA should be more likely to fail. Stated in the alternative (see Appendix B 
for a formal model): 
 
H1: The probability of bank failure is increasing in the proportion of regulatory capital 
composed of DTA. 
 
                                                     
10
 Adjusted tier 1 capital is the tier 1 capital amount reported on the Form FR Y-9C plus disallowed DTA, 
disallowed service assets (mortgage and non-mortgage servicing assets), and purchased credit card relationships (see 
Appendix A). 
11
 Banks can net DTA and DTL across jurisdictions in their regulatory filings, and thus generally only report a net 
DTA or net DTL position. 
12
 Banks do not directly report the amount of DTA included (which is net DTA minus the DTA excluded). This 
calculation must be made manually. I explain this further in the Section IV. Banks also do not indicate how much of 
their DTA are dependent on future taxable income, nor do they separate out excluded DTA into amounts excluded 




If banks that have a greater proportion of capital composed of DTA are more likely to 
fail, then market participants should incorporate this increased probability of failure when 
assessing the credit risk of these institutions. Stated in the alternative: 
 
H2a:  Market measures of credit risk are increasing in the proportion of regulatory capital 
composed of DTA. 
 
However, the credit risk attached to the DTA component of regulatory capital should 
vary predictably with expected future performance. Banks with a higher probability of 
experiencing future losses have a greater need for capital with which to absorb the losses, and 
thus the composition of capital is more relevant for these banks. Given two banks with equally 
large probabilities of experiencing future losses, a bank with a smaller proportion of capital 
composed of DTA will be able to absorb a larger amount of losses and thus less likely to default 
than a bank with a greater proportion of capital composed of DTA. Market participants are likely 
to attach more credit risk to DTA capital in banks that are more likely to experience future 
losses. Stated in the alternative: 
 
H2b: The credit risk associated with the DTA component of capital is decreasing in the 
expected future profitability of the bank. 
 
Finally, the rules governing the inclusion of DTA into regulatory capital may have 
incentivized poorly capitalized banks to increase risk-taking (Shackelford et al. 2010; 
Shackelford et al. 2011). Banks are only allowed to count DTA towards regulatory capital if the 
DTA are expected to be realized within the next twelve months. For banks looking to boost 
14 
 
capital ratios, including more DTA into capital may have been a low cost alternative to issuing 
new equity or debt. To include additional DTA into capital, banks would have had to convince 
regulators and auditors that the DTA were likely to be realized in the next twelve months. Banks 
could accomplish this by making risky investments, since the larger expected payoffs that 
accompany riskier investments would provide additional expected income against which the 
DTA could be realized.
13
 On average, increased risk-taking in the current period should manifest 
in future periods.
14
 Thus, I expect that banks that are engaging in increased risk-taking in order to 
include more DTA into capital will show signs of increased risk in future periods. Furthermore, I 
expect that only banks with relatively low levels of capital will engage in this strategy. Stated in 
the alternative:  
 
H3: Current changes in the amount of DTA included in capital are positively associated with 
future changes in risk, but only for poorly capitalized banks.  
 
There are several reasons why empirically I may not find results allowing me to reject the 
null for Hypothesis 1. First, one of the primary causes of the recent recession was the housing 
market crash. Therefore, the dominant factors as to whether banks survived or failed during this 
period may be (1) location (i.e. were they located in a region that was heavily affected by the 
decline in the housing market) and (2) reliance on real estate loans. Second, simply having an 
increased probability of default does not mean that more failures will be observed, especially if 
the higher credit risk associated with DTA capital is not economically significant. 
                                                     
13
 The addition to tier 1 capital would be the difference between the increase in DTA included in capital because of 
the new risky investment minus the after-tax effect of the loan loss provision. An example: a bank is looking to 
replace a $1,000 expiring investment, has $200 in new or existing DTA not included in capital, and faces a 50% tax 
rate. If the bank invests the $1,000 in an investment with a 20% expected return, it will generate an expected tax 
liability of $100 thus allowing the bank to include half of the DTA into regulatory capital. As long as the after-tax 
loan loss provision is less than $100, the new investment will result in an increase in regulatory capital. Furthermore, 
the addition to capital is increasing in the expected return (and thus riskiness) of the investment. 
14
 I examine risk outcomes since it is difficult to directly observe risk-taking behavior. 
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 Likewise, even if there is a positive association between the proportion of capital 
composed of DTA and the probability of bank failure, there are two reasons I may not find that 
market participants impound this increased probability of failure in their assessments of credit 
risk (i.e., fail to reject the null for Hypothesis 2a and/or 2b). First, banking trade groups have 
argued that regulators should treat banks as going concerns that will earn future taxable income. 
Credit market participants may view banks in this manner, and thus consider DTA as being 
similar in quality to other components of regulatory capital. Second, since there are limitations 
on the extent to which DTA can be included in regulatory capital, the DTA portion of regulatory 
capital is small in comparison to other components and market participants may not judge it to be 
a material source of credit risk.  
 
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Association between DTA capital and bank failures 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that there will be a positive association between the proportion of 
capital composed of DTA at the onset of the recent recession and the probability of failure during 
the recession. To test this, I estimate the following Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972): 
 ( )          〈                                           
                                              
                                     〉                 ( ) 
 
I employ a hazard model because of its superiority in forecasting bankruptcies (Shumway 
2001).
15
 In this model, h0(t) represents the baseline hazard rate that is a function of time. 
Multiplying this baseline rate by the exp[XiBi] allows the hazard rate to depend on the vector of 
                                                     
15
 Despite evidence in Shumway (2001) that hazard models are superior at predicting bankruptcy, logistic models 
have also been used in predicting bank failures (Kolari et al., 2002). Inferences are similar to those presented if I 
instead estimate a similar model using logistic regression (results not tabulated). 
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explanatory variables. In the tables, I report both the coefficients and the hazard ratios, the latter 
representing the change in the risk of failure attributable to a one-standard deviation change 
(one-unit change for indicator variables) in the independent variable. Since the National Bureau 
of Economic Research declared that the recent recession began in December 2007, I measure all 
independent variables as of December 31, 2007. The dependent variable is the number of days 
until bank failure. For banks that do not fail during the sample period (January 1, 2008 through 
June 30, 2010), this equals the number of days in the sample period. 
 The main independent variable is DTAPercent, which is measured as the amount of DTA 
included in tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. To calculate the amount of DTA included in 
tier 1 regulatory capital, I take the net DTA reported in the appropriate regulatory form and 
subtract out the amount of DTA the bank excluded from the regulatory capital calculation. If the 
resulting amount is negative, I set it equal to zero.
16
 I expect that the coefficient on DTAPercent 
will be positive, indicating that an increase in the proportion of capital composed of DTA at the 
beginning of the recent crisis increased the risk of failure over the period. 
For this analysis, I include control variables previously found to be associated with bank 
failures (Ng and Roychowdhury 2011). Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 capital ratio. Since the 
hypothesis relies on holding constant the overall level of capital and varying only the percentage 
of capital composed of DTA, it is important to control for the bank‟s overall level of capital. I 
also estimate this model replacing Tier1Ratio with the bank‟s total capital and leverage ratios, 
TotalRatio and LeverageRatio, respectively. RealEstateLoans is the ratio of the bank‟s real estate 
loans to total assets. Nonperform is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. AssetRisk is 
the ratio of the bank‟s 100 percent risk-weighted assets to total risk-weighted assets. Overhead is 
                                                     
16
 The actual ratio of DTA in tier 1 capital to total tier 1 capital is not disclosed in the machine-readable regulatory 
filing data, and thus I must manually calculate it. However, this ratio is disclosed in the Uniform Bank Performance 
Reports (UBPR). A manual review of several randomly selected banks confirms that my calculated ratio matches the 
ratio reported in the UBPR. 
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the non-interest expense as a percentage of total assets. ROA4Qtr is the net income over the past 
four quarters, scaled by average total assets over the same period. DepositLiquidity is the bank‟s 
cash and available-for-sale securities as a percentage of total deposits. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. West is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank was located in the 
Region 4 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, and zero otherwise.
17
 
I make no prediction regarding the association between bank failures and Tier1Ratio. 
While intuition suggests that bank failures should be negatively related to the bank‟s regulatory 
capital, riskier banks may choose to hold more capital. Furthermore, increases in capital 
requirements could lead banks to shift to riskier assets (Koehn and Santomero 1980). Thus, a 
higher Tier1Ratio could be indicative of greater risk and failure probability. Prior research on 
this matter is mixed (Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Aggarwal and Jacques 2001; Rime 2001; Bologna 
2011). Regardless of the relation between Tier1Ratio and credit risk, I expect that the 
composition of tier 1 capital will still matter. That is, even if risky banks choose to hold more 
capital, holding a greater proportion of the capital in the form of DTA will make the bank more 
susceptible to negative shocks and increase its credit risk.  
Regarding the rest of the control variables, consistent with prior research and with 
intuition, I expect bank failures to be positively associated with higher values of RealEstateLoan, 
Nonperform, and AssetRisk during the recent recession. I expect that banks located in the western 
United States will be more likely to fail, as it was the area most affected by the recent housing 
market crash.
18
 On the other hand, I expect bank failures to be negatively associated with higher 
values of DepositLiquidity, because holding more cash should allow the bank to satisfy 
withdrawal requests. I have no prediction regarding the association between bank failures and 
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 Inferences are generally unchanged if the following additional control variables are included: an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if ROA4Qtr is negative and zero otherwise, loan loss provisions, and uninsured deposits (results not 
tabulated). 
18
 In my sample, approximately 16 percent of the banks located in Region 4 failed, compared to 5 percent in Region 
2 and 7 percent in Region 3. Region 1 experienced no failures in my sample. 
18 
 
ROA4Qtr and Overhead. Generally, being more profitable should lower the probability of 
failure, which suggests that higher values of ROA4Qtr should be associated with a lower 
probability of failure. However, some of the most profitable banks leading up to the recent 
financial crisis were hardest hit during the crisis. Higher values of Overhead could indicate 
inefficiencies, which would increase the likelihood of bank failure, while they could also indicate 
that management is well paid and thus not prone to take on large risks (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003). Finally, I have no expectation as to the association between Size and bank 
failures. Smaller banks were more likely to fail during the recession, but I choose my sample 




Association between DTA capital and market assessments of credit risk 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that if banks with a greater proportion of capital composed of 
DTA are more likely to fail, then market participants, specifically credit rating agencies and bond 
market investors, should impound this information when assessing a bank‟s credit risk. To test 
Hypothesis 2a, I estimate the following pooled regressions: 
                                                                     
                                                                         ( ) 
                                                                     
                                                        
                                                                                                         ( ) 
 
Ratingt+1 is the bank‟s Standard & Poor credit rating for quarter t+1. Rating ranges from 
1 to 22, where 1 represents the highest rating (AAA) and 22 represents the lowest rating (SD or 
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D). Spreadt+1 is the difference in the yield from the bank‟s outstanding bonds and a risk-free 
security of equivalent duration. Thus, higher values of Ratingt+1 and Spreadt+1 correspond to 
higher values of credit risk. Both measures of credit risk are measured in quarter t+1, whereas the 
independent variables are measured at time t. This is done to ensure that all of the explanatory 
variables are available to market participants (i.e., rating agencies and bond traders) at time t+1 
for purposes of determining the bank‟s credit risk. 
As before, DTAPercent is the primary variable of interest and is measured as the amount 
of DTA included in tier 1 regulatory capital divided by the total amount of tier 1 regulatory 
capital. A positive α1 would indicate that the market participant‟s assessment of credit risk is 
increasing in the proportion of capital composed of DTA. 
I include controls for credit risk used previously in the literature (Anderson et al. 2004; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2011). Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 
capital ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Liquidity is the sum of cash and 
available-for-sale securities scaled by total assets. Loans is total loans outstanding scaled by total 
assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 months. Crisis is 
an indicator variable equal to one if the bank-quarter occurs during the recent recession as 
defined by the NBER (December 2007 through June 2009), and zero otherwise. For the bond 
spreads regression, I include two additional control variables, Maturity and Coupon. Maturity is 
the time remaining to maturity (measured in years) and Coupon is the bond‟s annual coupon rate.  
In testing the market‟s assessment of credit risk, it is especially important to control for 
the past and expected future performance of the bank. Past losses can result in net operating loss 
carryforwards, a form of DTA that can be counted towards regulatory capital. However, past 
losses may also increase market participants‟ perception of credit risk. Failing to control for past 
and expected future performance could result in the coefficient on DTAPercent picking up the 
20 
 
information in DTA regarding these variables. This is the information effect of DTA previously 
documented in the literature. To control for past performance, I include ROAQtr, which is net 
income in quarter t scaled by total assets. I also use ROAQtr to control for the future expected 
performance of the bank, which relies on the assumption that market participants view the 
earnings process of the bank as a random walk. 
To verify the robustness of my results, I employ alternative definitions of Tier1Ratio and 
ROAQtr. In place of Tier1Ratio, I use the bank‟s total capital and leverage ratios, TotalRatio and 
LeverageRatio, respectively. In place of ROAQtr, I use ROA4Qtr, defined as the sum of net 
income over the previous four quarters over the average total assets during the same period. All 
ratios are multiplied by 100 to convert them into percentages.
20
 
As for the control variables, my predictions follow prior research. I expect that credit risk 
will be decreasing in Size, as larger banks are less risky. I expect that credit risk is decreasing in 
ROAQtr (ROA4Qtr) since more profitable banks have experienced less capital erosion and thus 
are less risky. I predict that a bank‟s credit risk is decreasing in Liquid, as liquid assets can be 
more easily used to satisfy claims against the bank than illiquid assets. I expect credit risk will be 
decreasing in Loans, as loans represent revenue generating investments. I predict credit risk will 
be increasing in Volatility, as banks with higher volatility are more likely to experience 
insolvency inducing negative outcomes. I expect that credit risk is positively associated with 
Crisis, as risk was higher during the recent recession. As explained above, I make no prediction 
regarding the sign on Tier1Ratio, consistent with the mixed results from prior research on the 
association between capital ratios and risk (Shrieves and Dahl 1992; Aggarwal and Jacques 
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 Inferences from estimating equations 2 through 5 are generally unchanged if the following additional control 
variables are included: log of market value of equity as an alternate measure of size, an indicator variable equal to 1 
if ROA4 is negative and zero otherwise, ROA over quarters t-4 to t-7 and ROA over quarters t-8 to t-11, variables 
from the bank failure analysis (real estate loans, non-performing loans, asset risk, overhead, and deposit liquidity), 
loan loss provisions, and year fixed effects instead of Crisis. Results are also generally unaffected if the 
contemporaneous credit rating (spread) is included as an additional control variable in the spread (rating) regressions 
(results not tabulated). 
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2001; Rime 2001; Bologna 2011). I predict that Coupon is positively associated with bond 
spreads. Generally bonds with longer maturities have higher spreads, but since a part of my 
sample occurs during the recent financial crisis (when the yield curve was inverted) I make no 
prediction for Maturity. 
 
Association between DTA capital, market assessments of credit risk, and profitability 
Hypothesis 2b suggests that since the composition of bank capital is less relevant for 
banks that are less likely to experience insolvency-inducing negative outcomes, the increased 
credit risk associated with DTA capital should be negatively associated with expected future 
profitability. To test this, I estimate the following pooled regressions: 
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                                                                                     ( ) 
 
All variables are defined as previously discussed. My proxy for expected future 
profitability is ROA4Qtr, which assumes market participants believe the bank‟s earnings process 
is approximated by a random walk.
21
 Consistent with Hypothesis 2b, I expect α2 (the coefficient 
on the interaction of DTAPercent and ROA4Qtr) to be negative. 
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 Inferences are generally similar if the proxy for expected profitability is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank 
has a ROA4 above the sample median in that quarter and zero otherwise, a variable ranging from zero to one based 
on which decile the bank‟s ROA4 is in that quarter, and median/decile variables based on the most recent median 
analyst earnings forecast for the current fiscal year. 
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Association between increases in DTA capital and future risk outcomes 
Hypothesis 3 suggests that if the rules governing the inclusion of DTA into capital 
incentivize banks needing capital to increase risk-taking, then a positive association should be 
observed between current period changes in DTA included into capital and future changes in risk 
proxies. To test this, I estimate the following pooled regressions: 
                                                       
                                                                
                                                                   ( ) 
The dependent variable is the future change in risk. I employ two proxies for a bank‟s 
risk, the change in equity volatility (ΔVolatility) and the change in nonperforming loans (ΔNPL). 
ΔVolatility is the future period‟s equity volatility minus the current period‟s volatility, where 
volatility is calculated as previously described. ΔNPL is calculated as the future period‟s 
nonperforming loans minus the current period‟s nonperforming loans, scaled by current total 
loans. I measure the change in future risk over three different periods: one quarter, two quarters, 
and four quarters. 
 The primary independent variables are ΔDTAIncluded and PoorlyCapitalized. 
ΔDTAIncluded is defined as the current quarter‟s DTA included in regulatory capital minus the 
previous quarter‟s DTA included in capital, scaled by lagged total assets. PoorlyCapitalized is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank had a tier 1 ratio in the bottom 30% of all banks  at the 
beginning of the quarter, and zero otherwise. If poorly capitalized banks are making risky 
investments in order to justify including more DTA into capital during the current period, and if 
those risky investments manifest in risk outcomes in future periods, then I would expect that 
ΔDTAIncluded will be positively associated with future changes in risk for these banks. Thus I 
predict a positive coefficient on the interaction term ΔDTAIncluded*PoorlyCapitalized. I also 
23 
 





V. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Sample selection for bank failure tests 
I test hypothesis 1 using U.S. commercial banks and thrifts. I examine commercial banks 
rather than bank holding companies (“BHC”) for this hypothesis because commercial banks fail 
more often than BHC. The FDIC maintains a list of failed commercial banks on its website. 
I require commercial banks in my sample to have a minimum of $750 million in total 
assets to balance my desire to investigate large banks against the need to observe some bank 
failures.
23
 I investigate large banks because (1) DTA capital is more prevalent in large banks, and 
(2) regulators are likely more concerned with the failure of large banks than small banks.
24,25
 I 
require non-missing data for all regression variables. To mitigate the effect of outliers in my 
main independent variable, I delete observations in the top 1 percent of DTAPercent (by 
definition, it is bounded below at zero). Finally, I discard observations with tier 1 capital ratios 
greater than 200 percent, as these generally represent data errors (i.e., 8 was recorded instead of 
0.08). 
For the commercial bank sample, all data comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago.
26
 Accounting and regulatory data is measured as of December 31, 2007, and bank 
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 Inferences are generally unaffected if the cut-off for PoorlyCapitalized is the bottom 20% or 40% of banks by tier 
1 ratio at the beginning of the quarter. 
23
 Results are not sensitive to this choice. For example, inferences are qualitatively similar if the cut-off is between 
$500 million and $1 billion. 
24
 74 percent of banks with assets greater than $750 million have DTA capital, whereas only 44 percent of banks 
with less than $750 million in assets have DTA capital. 
25
 Two reasons regulators may be concerned with the failure of large banks rather than small banks: (1) the failure of 
large banks can have ripple effects on the rest of the economy, and (2) liquidating large banks is likely more costly 
and difficult.  
26
 For both the commercial bank and BHC samples, I get quarterly data on DTA from the regulatory filings. As 
these filings do not break down DTA by type, I cannot estimate separately the effects of different types of DTA. 
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failures examined occur between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2010. The final commercial bank 
sample contains 736 commercial banks and thrifts, 50 of which failed during the sample period. 
 
Sample selection for credit rating, bond spread, and risk-taking tests 
To examine hypotheses 2a and 2b, I employ a sample of U.S. bank holding companies 
because they are more likely to have a credit rating and more likely to issue bonds than 
commercial banks. For a BHC bank-quarter observation to be included in the sample it must 
have non-missing data for all independent variables, as well as a non-missing value for Ratingt+1. 
For the computation of Volatility I require at least 36 months of stock return data. I also eliminate 
DTAPercent and tier 1 capital ratio outliers as discussed above. 
For the BHC sample, I obtain accounting data and S&P credit ratings from the Compustat 
Quarterly file, bond variables from Datastream, stock returns from the CRSP monthly stock file, 
analyst forecast data from IBES, and regulatory capital and other accounting data (including 
quarterly DTA amounts) from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. I start my sample period 
with the first quarter of 2001 and end with the first quarter of 2010. The BHC dataset comprises 
of 2,050 (1,002) bank-quarter observations for the credit rating (bond spread) analyses, 
representing 67 (41) bank holding companies.
27
 
 To examine hypothesis 3, I employ the sample of BHC used in the credit rating and bond 
spread tests. To make the sample, bank-quarter observations had to have non-missing data for 
each dependent and independent variable. This sample contains 1,744 bank-quarter observations 
representing 67 bank-holding companies. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
While publicly traded banks would disclose DTA by type in the tax footnote to the financial statements, they do so 
in the annually, not quarterly. Furthermore, many commercial banks in my sample are not publicly traded. 
27
 The inferences from the credit ratings regressions are unaffected if I restrict those tests to bank-quarters with a 




 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the samples used in this 
study.
28
 Panel A in Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the commercial bank sample. 
On average, DTA made up 3 percent of tier 1 capital for commercial banks in my sample, and 74 
percent of banks were counting some DTA for regulatory capital purposes at the end of 2007. 
Banks in this sample were on average well capitalized, but some banks were below the minimum 
threshold for being considered well capitalized (tier 1 capital ratio of six percent). They were 
also very large, with average total assets of $13.7 billion. Real estate loans made up a large 
portion of the average bank balance sheet (over 50 percent of total assets). Only 20 percent of the 
banks were located in the western U.S., but account for almost half of the bank failures. Panel B 
in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the BHC sample. On average, DTA make up 2.4 
percent of tier 1 capital, and 55 percent of bank-quarter observations have some DTA included in 
regulatory capital. Banks in the BHC sample are much larger than those in the commercial bank 
sample, with the average total assets being $123 billion, and every bank is well-capitalized. The 
average spread is 222 basis points and the average credit rating is an A-. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 Panel C contains the correlation matrix for the commercial bank sample. DTAPercent is 
positively correlated with the real estate market variables (RealEstateLoans, Nonperform, 
AssetRisk, and West) and negatively correlated with Tier1Ratio, emphasizing the need to control 
for factors likely to be of first order importance in determining the failure of banks during the 
recession. Panel D presents the correlation matrix for the BHC sample. DTA capital is correlated 
negatively correlated with ROAQtr. This is probably a result of the operating loss carryforward 
component of DTA, and reinforces the need to control for bank performance when evaluating 
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 Ratios are generally calculated as percentages, and all continuous variables except for DTAPercent and capital 
ratios are winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent. 
26 
 
market perception of DTA capital. The two dependent variables, Spread and Rating, are 
positively correlated as expected. 
 In both panels C and D the primary variable of interest, DTAPercent, is consistently 
correlated with greater credit risk: increased risk of failure, lower credit ratings, and higher bond 
spreads. Figure 1 provides corroborating evidence: banks that failed or had credit risk measures 
greater than the sample median had higher percentages of regulatory capital composed of DTA 
and were more likely to have a large portion (5 percent or greater) of capital composed of DTA 
than banks that did not fail or were below the sample median on the two credit risk measures. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Association between DTA capital and bank failures 
Table 2 contains the results of estimating the Cox proportional hazards model given in 
equation 1.
29
 I report both the coefficients (panel A) and the hazard ratios (panel B). Positive 
coefficients and hazard ratios greater than one indicate that higher values of that variable 
increased the risk of failure during the recession. Column 1 contains the baseline estimation 
(equation 1 without DTAPercent). The most notable result from column 1 is that failure during 
the recent recession was driven largely by the housing market. Banks with more real estate loans, 
higher non-performing loan ratios, and riskier assets had higher failure risks, as did banks located 
in the western. Additionally, banks with lower capital ratios had higher failure risks (one-tailed 
p-value of 0.03), consistent with intuition and prior research (Bologna 2011). The ratios on all 
other control variables are generally consistent with predictions but statistically insignificant. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
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 Statistical inferences are made using standard errors clustered by bank and two-tailed tests unless otherwise noted. 
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Column 2 contains the estimation of equation 1 with only DTAPercent. The coefficient 
on DTAPercent is positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). In column 3, I include 
the other explanatory variables in the hazard model. The coefficient on DTAPercent remains 
positive and statistically significant, with the hazard ratio indicating that a one-standard deviation 
increase in DTAPercent increases the risk of bank failure by approximately 36 percent.
30
 By 
comparison, the economic significance of the real estate variables (RealEstateLoan, Nonperform, 
AssetRisk, and West) and the capital ratio variables is greater. Thus, while the DTA component 
of capital may not have had a first-order effect on bank failures during the recent crisis, it was 
still economically meaningful. The results in columns 4 and 5 indicate that the inferences in 
column 3 are unchanged when replacing Tier1Ratio with TotalRatio and LeverageRatio, 
respectively. Overall, the results in Table 2 show that banks with a greater proportion of capital 




Association between DTA capital and market assessments of credit risk 
Tables 3 and 4 contain the results from estimating equations 2 and 3, which test whether 
DTA capital is associated with lower credit ratings and greater bond spreads. 
Table 3 contains the results from estimating equation 2. Since credit rating is an ordinal 
variable, I estimate equation 2 using an ordered logistic regression. Column 1 contains a baseline 
regression that omits DTAPercent. As predicted, Size, ROAQtr, Liquidity, and Loans have 
negative and significant coefficients, suggesting banks that are larger, more profitable, more 
liquid, and have more loans have higher credit ratings. Interestingly, the coefficient Crisis is 
negative, although only occasionally significant, indicating that on average credit ratings were 
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 To calculate hazard ratios, I take the coefficient from the hazard regression and multiply it by the standard 
deviation for non-indicator variables (by 1 for indicator variables), then take the exponential of the resulting amount. 
31
 I also estimate equation 1 within an alternate sample, in which each failed bank is matched to a single non-failed 
bank that has the closest tier 1 ratio within the same decile of total assets. Inferences are qualitatively similar. 
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higher during the financial crisis. Volatility is positive and significant, meaning that banks with 
more volatile returns have lower credit ratings. Tier1Ratio is negatively associated with credit 
ratings, indicating that banks with higher tier 1 capital ratios had on average higher credit ratings, 
although it is not statistically significant.
32
  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 Column 2 contains the results from estimating equation 2 with only DTAPercent. The 
coefficient on DTAPercent is positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01), indicating that 
banks with a higher percentage of capital composed of DTA have worse credit ratings. Column 3 
contains the results from estimating the full model from equation 2. The coefficient on 
DTAPercent remains positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). Coefficients on the 
control variables are largely similar to those in column 1, except that the negative coefficient on 
Tier1Ratio becomes marginally significant (one-tailed p-value of 0.09). Columns 4, 5, and 6 
contain alternative specifications of the equation 2. In column 4, I replace ROAQtr with a more 
backward looking measure, ROA4Qtr. In columns 5 and 6, I use the TotalRatio and 
LeverageRatio in place of Tier1Ratio. In all of these alternative specifications the coefficient on 
DTAPercent remains positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01 in all three columns). The 
results in Table 3 are consistent with credit rating agencies considering the increased failure risk 
associated with DTA capital when setting credit ratings. 
Table 4 contains the estimation of equation 3 via OLS. As in Table 3, column 1 contains 
a baseline model including only control variables. The coefficients on the control variables are 
generally consistent with expectations, with the exception of Loans and Size which are only 
marginally significant. Also somewhat surprising is that Tier1Ratio is positive and significant 
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 The relatively weak significance of Tier1Ratio in the credit rating regressions appears to be driven by its high 
correlation with profitability (Spearman correlations of 0.64 with ROAQtr and 0.71 with ROA4Qtr). When 
profitability proxies are dropped from the model, the coefficient on Tier1Ratio becomes highly significant (p-value 
< 0.01), while other inferences remain unchanged. 
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which, while consistent with some prior research indicating that riskier banks maintain higher 
capital ratios, is inconsistent with the results from the bank failure and credit rating tests. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 Column 2 contains the results from estimating equation 3 without the control variables. 
As predicted, DTAPercent is positive and highly significant (p-value < 0.01), meaning banks 
with larger proportions of capital composed of DTA have higher bond spreads. When I include 
control variables in the regression (column 3), the coefficient on DTAPercent remains highly 
significant. According to column 3, a one-standard deviation increase in DTAPercent is 
associated with an approximately 28 basis point increase in the spread, representing a 12 percent 
increase over the average spread. Columns 4, 5, and 6 contain alternative specifications of the 
main regression in column 2. In columns 3 and 4, I use the bank‟s total ratio and leverage ratio 
instead of tier 1 ratio. In column 5, I use ROA4Qtr instead of ROAQtr. The inferences from 
column 2 are unchanged in these alternative specifications (one-tailed p-values of 0.05, 0.02, and 
0.02 in columns 3, 4, and 5, respectively). DTAPercent is consistently positive as well as 
statistically and economically meaningful, indicating that on average banks with greater 
proportions of capital composed of DTA have higher bond spreads. Taken as a whole, the results 
in Table 4 suggest that bond market investors impound the increased failure risk associated with 
DTA capital when assessing credit risk. 
 
Association between DTA capital, market assessments of credit risk, and profitability 
 The analyses in Table 5 test whether the increased credit risk associated with DTA capital 
is lessened for banks that are expected to be profitable in the future. As stated before, my 
measure of expected profitability is ROA4Qtr. To test whether an increase in expected 
profitability decreases the credit risk market participants associate with DTA capital, I test 
30 
 
whether the coefficient on the interaction of DTAPercent and ROA4Qtr is significantly 
negatively. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Columns 1 and 2 contain the results from estimating the reduced and full versions of 
equation 4 using ordered logistic regression. As in Table 3, the coefficient on DTAPercent is 
positive and significant, and the coefficient on ROA4Qtr is negative and significant. However, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is insignificantly different from zero. Ai and Norton 
(2003) point out that statistical software packages do not always calculate correct coefficients for 
interaction effects in non-linear models.
33
 The coefficient on the interaction term remains 
insignificantly different from zero when I re-estimate the reduced and full versions of equation 4 
using OLS (columns 3 and 4).
34
 Given the problems with both ordered logistic and OLS 
specifications, I cannot determine whether the insignificant coefficient on the interaction is 
driven by incorrect econometrics or whether credit ratings agencies do not adjust the credit risk 
associated with DTA capital for expected profitability. 
Columns 5 and 6 contain the results from estimating reduced and full versions of 
equation 5 using OLS. In column 1, the coefficient on DTAPercent is positive and significant (p-
value < 0.01) and the coefficient on ROA4Qtr is negative and significant (p-value < 0.01), 
consistent with the results in Table 4. The coefficient on the interaction term 
DTAPercent*ROAQtr is negative and statistically significant (p-value 0.04). The negative 
coefficient indicates that the increased credit risk associated with DTA capital is partially 
mitigated for more profitable banks. Column 6 indicates that these results still hold when 
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 This is because calculating a cross-partial with respect to two variables in a non-linear model is not the same as 
calculating a main effect. Since the software does not know that the variable is an interaction term, it treats it like a 
main effect, thus calculating an incorrect coefficient. 
34
 This approach is not without its own problems. Since the dependent variable is a credit rating which only takes on 
integer values, this violates two assumptions of OLS: normally distributed errors and homoskedasticity. 
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including control variables (interaction term p-value of 0.01).
35
 Overall, the results in Table 5 
provide some evidence that the increased credit risk market participants associate with DTA 
capital is negatively associated with expected future profitability. 
  
Caveat regarding results from bank failure and market credit risk measures tests 
The conclusions reached in the bank failure and market credit risk tests are subject to one 
important caveat. I interpret my results as holding for all banks, but that need not be the case. For 
my bank failure tests I employ a sample of U.S. commercial banks, and for my market credit risk 
tests I use a sample of U.S. bank holding companies. It could be the case that DTA capital is not 
an economically meaningful factor in the failure probability of bank holding companies, and 
market participants may not correctly impound the increased failure risk associated with DTA 
capital when assessing the credit risk of commercial banks. While I believe this to be unlikely, it 
would be difficult to formally test for reasons previously mentioned: bank holding companies 
rarely fail, and commercial banks are generally not publicly traded and thus do not have 
sufficient data on bond spreads or S&P credit ratings. 
 
Association between changes in DTA included and future risk outcomes 
Table 6 presents the results from estimating equation 6. Panel A (Panel B) contains the 
results using the change in equity volatility (change in nonperforming loans) as the risk outcome 
proxy. I measure the dependent variable over three different time periods: over the next quarter 
(column 1), over the next two quarters (column 2), and over the next four quarters (column 3). 
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 When including control variables, being above the median of ROA4Qtr is associated with mitigation of 
approximately 61 percent of the credit risk associated with DTA capital, and moving up one decile in ROA4Qtr is 




For brevity, I only report the coefficients on the main independent variables (ΔDTAIncluded, 
PoorlyCapitalized, and the interaction term). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
The coefficient on the interaction term is largely consistent with expectations. When 
change in equity volatility is the risk proxy, the interaction term coefficient is positive and 
significant over all three time periods. When using change in nonperforming loans as the proxy 
for risk, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive for all three time periods and is 
statistically significant when the change is measured over the next two or four quarters. 
Furthermore, the sum of the coefficients on ΔDTAIncluded and the interaction term is positive in 
all six specifications (statistically significant in five of the six models), indicating that current 
changes in DTA included in capital are associated with increased future changes in risk only for 
poorly capitalized banks. Overall, the results are consistent with my hypothesis that banks with 
relatively poorer capital ratios took on riskier investments in the current period to justify 
counting more DTA in capital, and consequently displayed increases in risk in future periods. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 In this study, I find that proportion of regulatory capital composed of DTA is positively 
associated with the risk of bank failure. Furthermore, market participants appear to incorporate 
the increased risk of failure associated with the DTA component of capital when assessing bank 
credit risk. Finally, I find that the rules governing the inclusion of DTA into regulatory capital 
seem to have incentivized poorly capitalized banks to engage in increased risk-taking.  
Overall, my results are consistent with the position of the Basel Committee that DTA 
capital does not provide an adequate buffer against losses. Furthermore, the rules governing the 
inclusion of DTA into regulatory capital may hamper regulators‟ ability to practice forbearance. 
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This study also contributes to two literatures. First, this study extends the DTA valuation 
literature by examining the valuation of DTA by credit market participants. Finally, this paper 
contributes to the literature examining the association between regulatory capital and credit risk 
by being the first to investigate the association between credit risk and a specific component of 
tier 1 capital. Future research could consider whether other components of tier 1 capital, such as 










APPENDIX B – MODEL 
Baseline example 
To formally model my hypothesis, I borrow from the model in Shin (2010) of one bank 
and two available assets: a risky security and a risk-less security (cash). Following Shin‟s 
notation, let the price of the risky security at time t be    and the amount of the risky security 
held by the bank be   . The bank‟s cash holding is represented by   . The future (uncertain) price 
of the risky security is given by     . Let  ̃    denote the return from time t to t+1 on the risky 
security, distributed with mean   and variance   . Thus, the bank‟s holding of the risky security 
at time t+1 is equal to (1+ ̃   )     . The return is not necessarily independently distributed; 
there can be times where positive or negative returns are more likely. Finally, let the return on 
the risk-less asset be normalized to zero and the bank‟s capital at time t be represented by   . 
The bank is not limited to holding positive quantities of both the risky and risk-less 
assets. Specifically, it is able to borrow the risk-less asset and use the proceeds to purchase 
additional units of the risky security. Assume for the time being that the interest rate on such 
borrowing is equal to zero. At time t the asset side of the bank‟s balance sheet is composed of 
cash and securities held, and the liability side contains the initial contributed equity. That is, the 
following identity holds at date t:           , where a positive (negative)    represents a 
long (short) position in the risky asset and a positive (negative)    represents cash holdings 
(debt). 
At time t, the bank decides its holdings of the risky and risk-less securities. At time t+1, a 
return  ̃    is randomly selected, and the bank‟s balance sheet changes accordingly. Specifically, 
the new value of equity is given by      =         +    or, expressed another way, 
     =  ̃          +                          (7) 
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If the next period equity drops to zero or below (i.e., if        0) then the bank becomes 
insolvent. This happens if the return is sufficiently bad such that the following condition holds:
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 ̃       
  
    
       (8) 
The probability of insolvency is depicted in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Insolvency probability 
 
Note that a requirement to hold a certain amount of capital is similar to requiring a certain 
level of initial equity (  ). The purpose of such a requirement is to minimize the probability of 
insolvency. This is readily apparent in equation 8 and figure 1 above – the greater the amount of 
initial equity, the less likely that the next period return will be sufficiently bad enough to result in 
the failure of the bank. As mentioned before, this is one of the main purposes of regulatory 
capital – to reduce the likelihood of insolvency. 
 
Example with DTA capital 
                                                     
36
 Note that this condition assumes that the bank takes a long position in the risky asset. Otherwise, the insolvency 
condition would be the same but with   ̃    instead of  ̃   . Given that most banks do not hold short positions in 






To this point, I have not made any statements regarding the composition of equity. Now 
assume that equity can be composed of two things: (1) contributed capital (CC), which can be 
thought of as cash and (2) deferred tax assets (DTA). These two types of equity differ only in 
what states of the world they are able to satisfy claims against the bank. Specifically, in this 
example, the primary claim against the bank is offsetting losses suffered by the holdings in the 
risky asset. The important characteristic of contributed capital is that its ability to absorb losses is 
not dependent on the future state of the world (i.e. the realization of  ̃   ). The benefits that 
accompany DTA, on the other hand, are only realized when  ̃     . These assumptions are not 
implausible: cash, for example, can be used to satisfy claims against the bank regardless of the 
bank‟s performance, while DTA only result in tax savings (less cash taxes paid) when there is 
positive taxable income. Already, it should be clear that DTA capital is unable to absorb losses 
incurred by the risky asset holdings, since it can only satisfy claims against the bank when 
performance is good. 
In this next example, there are two banks, Bank A and Bank B. Bank A‟s equity is 
composed of contributed capital, while Bank B‟s equity is composed of both contributed capital 
and DTA. Furthermore, let the two banks have the same overall levels of the risky asset and 
equity. In other words, the following holds: 
                             
                              
         (i.e.,            ) 
When performance is good (i.e. when  ̃     ), the benefits from the DTA are realized 
in the form of tax savings. Those tax savings are then recognized in retained earnings. Thus, 
when performance is good, the equities of the two banks will be equal and the composition of 
equity is irrelevant. More importantly, when  ̃     , equity is not needed to offset losses. 
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However, if performance is poor (i.e. when  ̃     ), equity is needed in order to offset 
the losses experienced by the bank‟s holding of the risky asset. For Bank A, it can suffer losses 
(negative realizations of  ̃   ) without experiencing insolvency as long as the following 
condition holds: 
 ̃       
     
    
     (9) 
However, as soon as the future return becomes negative, Bank B‟s DTA become worthless (as 
they are only realizable in the state of the world where  ̃     ). Thus, Bank B can only suffer 
losses without becoming insolvent as long as the following condition holds: 
 ̃       
     
    
     (10) 
Since Bank A has a larger amount of contributed capital than Bank B (i.e.            ), 
equation 9 will be satisfied for more random realizations of  ̃    than will equation 10. Thus, the 
probability of insolvency will be higher for Bank B than Bank A. The increased insolvency 
probability is shown in Figure 2. 
 











To summarize the preceding discussion, when performance is poor, the actual equity of Bank B 
decreases relative to Bank A. Thus, the likelihood of insolvency will be higher for Bank B than 
Bank A. This forms the basis for Hypotheses 1 and 2a. 
The credit risk associated with DTA capital is given by  
    [ 
           
    
  ̃     
     
    
], where                            (replacing DTA 
capital with contributed capital). In other words, this is the additional probability of default that 
the bank incurs by holding a portion of its capital as DTA instead of contributed capital. In the 
above example, this is represented by the area under the probability curve between  
     
    
 and 
 
     
    
 in Figure 2 above (since Bank A is essentially Bank B with no DTA capital). 
Now assume that there is a third bank, Bank C, that is similar in every way to Bank B 
(i.e., same amount of risky and risk-less asset holdings, composition of equity, and variance of 
future returns), except that the mean of the future return distribution is  , where    . That is, 
Bank C is expected to be more profitable than Bank B. In this scenario, the return distribution for 
Bank C has been shifted to the right compared to that of Bank B. Because of the shift in the 
return distribution, Bank C has a smaller overall probably of insolvency than does Bank B. 
Furthermore, the additional credit risk associated with DTA is less for Bank C than Bank B, 
despite the fact that both banks have equivalent amounts of DTA capital. That is, 
    [ 
           
    
  ̃     
     
    
] is smaller than     [ 
           
    
  ̃     
     
    
]. 





Figure 3: Insolvency probabilities when mean return is higher for one bank 
 
Therefore, while there is still an additional probability of insolvency attached to the DTA 
component of equity, it is less so for the bank that ex-ante is expected to be more profitable. 
This forms the basis for Hypothesis 2b.  
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TABLE 1 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRICES 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics for Commercial Bank Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
DTAPercent 736 2.986 3.029 0.000 0.000 2.457 4.671 18.124 
DTACapInd 736 0.740 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Fail 736 0.068 0.252 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tier1Ratio 736 11.867 6.436 2.090 9.370 10.220 12.170 93.270 
TotalRatio 736 13.212 6.395 3.400 10.690 11.415 13.450 93.460 
LeverageRatio 736 9.320 4.853 1.700 7.620 8.520 9.610 96.420 
RealEstateLoans 736 50.934 18.961 0.000 41.141 53.988 63.647 87.243 
Nonperform 736 0.963 1.191 0.000 0.276 0.608 1.161 7.225 
AssetRisk 736 77.102 11.799 33.616 72.402 79.367 84.756 96.988 
Overhead 736 2.701 1.266 0.239 2.130 2.546 3.066 9.629 
ROA4Qtr 736 0.026 0.019 -0.018 0.017 0.025 0.032 0.130 
DepositLiquidity 736 5.146 8.158 0.339 2.400 3.410 4.665 61.014 
Size 736 7.737 1.194 6.636 6.878 7.323 8.135 12.073 






Panel B – Descriptive Statistics for Bank Holding Company Sample 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Maximum 
DTAPercent 2049 2.414 3.409 0.000 0.000 0.168 4.286 16.135 
DTACapInd 2049 0.547 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ΔDTAIncluded 1744 0.011 0.089 -0.253 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.426 
Ratingt+1 2049 7.345 2.277 2.000 6.000 7.000 9.000 22.000 
Spreadt+1 1030 222.132 207.919 48.151 99.812 139.037 243.800 1048.990 
Tier1Ratio 2049 11.734 10.444 6.430 8.550 9.900 11.660 107.770 
TotalRatio 2049 14.447 10.010 10.040 11.680 12.550 14.130 107.880 
LeverageRatio 2049 8.868 6.917 4.130 6.920 7.810 8.840 76.260 
Size 2049 10.420 1.376 8.574 9.305 10.156 11.226 14.390 
ROAQtr 2049 0.300 0.358 -1.130 0.226 0.312 0.383 2.349 
ROA4Qtr 2049 1.249 1.393 -3.896 0.921 1.263 1.544 9.760 
Liquid 2049 23.332 12.004 1.757 14.987 20.657 28.887 64.569 
Loans 2049 57.049 17.678 4.559 51.008 63.238 68.843 79.484 
Volatility 2049 0.079 0.030 0.035 0.056 0.077 0.094 0.186 
Maturity 1002 13.243 7.343 2.197 7.489 10.673 19.236 29.078 
Coupon 1002 626.244 102.692 318.771 567.300 637.500 679.789 937.500 







Panel C – Correlation Matrix for Commercial Bank Sample 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 DTAPercent   0.58 0.20 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.03 -0.16 -0.06 -0.04 0.10 
2 DTACapInd 0.77   0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.09 0.17 0.03 0.10 -0.03 -0.15 -0.09 -0.16 0.05 
3 Fail 0.18 0.12   -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 0.22 0.29 0.15 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04 0.19 
4 Tier1Ratio -0.13 -0.07 -0.12   0.99 0.73 -0.28 -0.03 -0.28 0.01 0.22 0.23 -0.08 0.03 
5 TotalRatio -0.11 -0.11 -0.14 0.88   0.73 -0.30 -0.03 -0.29 0.03 0.23 0.25 -0.03 0.04 
6 LeverageRatio -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.51   -0.19 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.42 0.26 -0.08 0.14 
7 RealEstateLoans 0.18 0.18 0.24 -0.17 -0.25 0.09   0.20 0.25 -0.20 -0.20 -0.31 -0.34 0.02 
8 Nonperform 0.11 0.06 0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.05 0.20   0.17 0.02 -0.13 -0.11 -0.06 0.03 
9 AssetRisk 0.07 0.08 0.17 -0.20 -0.28 0.20 0.24 0.22   0.12 0.15 -0.17 -0.30 0.14 
10 Overhead 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.07 0.11   0.21 0.11 0.02 0.00 
11 ROA4Qtr -0.15 -0.12 -0.03 0.04 0.05 0.24 -0.09 -0.13 0.21 0.08   0.13 0.02 0.20 
12 DepositLiquidity -0.15 -0.13 -0.18 0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.36 -0.10 -0.03 0.33 0.20   0.21 0.04 
13 Size -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.28 -0.01 -0.22 -0.09 0.02 0.10   0.03 






Panel D – Correlation Matrix for Bank Holding Company Sample 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 DTAPercent   0.64 0.27 0.45 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.12 -0.16 -0.18 -0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.34 -0.08 0.21 
2 DTACapInd 0.91   0.35 0.28 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.23 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 0.05 0.03 -0.38 -0.11 0.09 
3 Ratingt+1 0.38 0.37   0.34 -0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.59 -0.24 -0.28 -0.15 0.05 0.36 -0.42 -0.02 0.01 
4 Spreadt+1 0.31 0.19 0.27   0.24 0.24 0.33 0.00 -0.58 -0.65 -0.16 0.13 0.28 -0.21 0.06 0.57 
5 Tier1Ratio 0.22 0.22 0.33 0.19   0.99 0.97 -0.21 0.64 0.71 0.33 -0.47 0.11 -0.28 -0.11 0.01 
6 TotalRatio 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.80   0.97 -0.17 0.64 0.71 0.31 -0.45 0.10 -0.22 -0.15 0.02 
7 LeverageRatio 0.15 0.13 0.23 0.24 0.60 0.56   -0.19 0.64 0.72 0.23 -0.34 0.05 -0.31 -0.18 0.05 
8 Size -0.25 -0.26 -0.62 0.03 -0.44 -0.20 -0.31   -0.11 -0.11 -0.22 -0.10 0.04 0.54 0.18 0.05 
9 ROAQtr -0.19 -0.14 -0.24 -0.52 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.03   0.90 0.24 -0.33 -0.12 0.16 0.02 -0.26 
10 ROA4Qtr -0.21 -0.14 -0.27 -0.52 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.89   0.24 -0.34 -0.18 0.19 0.02 -0.22 
11 Liquid 0.02 0.07 -0.01 -0.23 0.44 0.40 0.08 -0.29 0.16 0.14   -0.56 0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 
12 Loans 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.11 -0.37 -0.36 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.55   -0.36 -0.13 0.03 0.11 
13 Volatility -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.29 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.16 0.04 -0.30   0.03 0.03 -0.06 
14 Maturity -0.43 -0.40 -0.46 -0.05 -0.33 -0.20 -0.36 0.60 0.23 0.23 -0.07 -0.20 0.12   0.43 -0.25 
15 Coupon -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 0.25 -0.09 -0.10 -0.21 0.23 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.12 0.47   -0.09 
16 Crisis 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.54 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.05 -0.38 -0.37 -0.13 0.14 -0.09 -0.28 -0.10   
 
This table contains the descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for both the commercial bank sample and bank holding company sample. Panel A (B) contains the 
descriptive statistics and Panel C (D) contains the correlation matrix for the commercial bank (bank holding company) sample. Spearman (Pearson) correlations are above 
(below) the diagonal. DTAPercent is the amount of DTA included in tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. DTACapInd is an indicator variable equal to one if 
DTAPercent is positive, and zero otherwise. Fail is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank failed between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2010, and zero otherwise. 
Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 capital ratio. TotalRatio is the bank‟s total capital ratio. LeverageRatio is the bank‟s leverage ratio. RealEstateLoans is the ratio of the 
bank‟s real estate loans to total assets. Nonperform is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. AssetRisk is the ratio of the bank‟s 100 percent risk-weighted assets 
to total risk-weighted assets. Overhead is the non-interest expense as a percentage of total assets. ROA4Qtr is the net income over the past four quarters, scaled by average 
total assets over the same period. DepositLiquidity is the bank‟s cash and available-for-sale securities as a percentage of total deposits. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. West is an indicator variable equal to one of the bank was located in the Region 4 according to the U.S. Census Bureau, and zero otherwise. ΔDTAIncluded is the 
current quarter‟s DTA included in regulatory capital minus the previous quarter‟s DTA included in capital, scaled by lagged total assets. Ratingt+1 is the bank‟s Standard 
& Poor credit rating for quarter t+1, where 1 represents the highest rating (AAA) and 22 represents the lowest rating (SD or D). Spreadt+1 is the difference in the yield 
from the bank‟s outstanding bonds and a risk-free security of equivalent duration. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROAQtr is net income in quarter t scaled by 
total assets. Liquidity is the sum of cash and available-for-sale securities scaled by total assets. Loans is total loans outstanding scaled by total assets. Volatility is the 
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standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 months. Maturity is the time remaining to maturity (measured in years). Coupon is the bond‟s annual coupon rate. 
Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank-quarter occurs during the recent recession as defined by the NBER (December 2007 through June 2009), and zero 
otherwise. All variables are measured at quarter t except for Spread and Rating (measured at quarter t+1) and Fail (measured between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2010). 
All continuous variables except DTAPercent and capital ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Ratios are measured in percentages. Note that descriptive statistics 





TABLE 2 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DTA CAPITAL AND BANK FAILURES 
 
Panel A – Coefficients 
 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Sign h(t) h(t) h(t) h(t) h(t) 
DTAPercent + 
 
0.201*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.107*** 
   
(5.642) (2.882) (3.363) (2.971) 








  TotalRatio ? 
   
-0.197* 
   
    
(-1.740) 
 LeverageRatio ? 
    
-0.126 
  
     
(-1.156) 
RealEstateLoans + 0.054*** 
 




(4.125) (4.096) (4.456) 
Nonperform + 0.477*** 
 




(5.872) (6.012) (5.464) 
AssetRisk + 0.042* 
 




(1.534) (1.492) (1.770) 
Overhead ? -0.178 
 




(-0.599) (-0.588) (-0.512) 
ROA4Qtr - -5.305 
 




(-0.090) (0.019) (-0.077) 
DepositLiquidity - -0.051 
 




(-0.375) (-0.325) (-0.536) 
Size ? 0.113 
 




(0.639) (0.842) (0.877) 
West + 1.343*** 
 




(3.915) (3.915) (4.034) 





Panel B – Hazard ratios 
 
VARIABLES Prediction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
DTAPercent > 1 
 
1.838 1.362 1.395 1.383 
Tier1Ratio ? 0.326 
 
0.371 
  TotalRatio ? 
   
0.284 
 LeverageRatio ? 
    
0.543 
RealEstateLoans > 1 2.784 
 
2.784 2.784 2.947 
Nonperform > 1 1.765 
 
1.689 1.705 1.643 
AssetRisk > 1 1.641 
 
1.547 1.529 1.701 
Overhead ? 0.798 
 
0.849 0.850 0.874 
ROA4Qtr < 1 0.902 
 
0.975 1.005 0.980 
DepositLiquidity < 1 0.660 
 
0.710 0.752 0.670 
Size ? 1.144 
 
1.144 1.196 1.206 
West > 1 3.831   3.721 3.732 3.951 
This table contains the results of estimating the association between failure risk and the proportion of tier 1capital composed 
of DTA (equation 1) using a Cox proportional hazards model on the commercial bank sample. DTAPercent is the amount of 
DTA included in tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 capital ratio. TotalRatio is the bank‟s 
total capital ratio. LeverageRatio is the bank‟s leverage ratio. RealEstateLoans is the ratio of the bank‟s real estate loans to 
total assets. Nonperform is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. AssetRisk is the ratio of the bank‟s 100 percent 
risk-weighted assets to total risk-weighted assets. Overhead is the non-interest expense as a percentage of total assets. 
ROA4Qtr is the net income over the past four quarters, scaled by average total assets over the same period. DepositLiquidity 
is the bank‟s cash and available-for-sale securities as a percentage of total deposits. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. West is an indicator variable equal to one of the bank was located in the Region 4 according to the U.S. Census 
Bureau, and zero otherwise. The independent variable of interest is DTAPercent. Coefficients are reported in Panel A, hazard 
ratios are reported in Panel B. Hazard ratios are calculated using a one-standard deviation change for continuous variables 
and a one-unit change for indicator variables. Z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 




TABLE 3 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DTA CAPITAL AND CREDIT RATINGS 
 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign. Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 
DTAPercent + 
 
0.167*** 0.131*** 0.123*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 
   
(3.824) (3.185) (2.966) (3.197) (3.209) 








  TotalRatio ? 
    
-0.023 
 
      
(-1.586) 
 LeverageRatio ? 
     
-0.039* 
       
(-1.929) 
Size - -1.828*** 
 




(-8.392) (-8.157) (-8.474) (-8.250) 













   
-0.684*** 
    
    
(-3.725) 
  Liquidity - -0.081*** 
 




(-4.041) (-3.984) (-4.025) (-4.047) 
Loans - -0.020 
 




(-1.403) (-1.551) (-1.397) (-1.348) 
Volatility + 30.990*** 
 




(4.583) (3.748) (4.596) (4.529) 
Crisis + -0.180 
 
-0.398* -0.455** -0.383* -0.338 
    (-0.930) 
 
(-1.915) (-2.074) (-1.847) (-1.596) 
Observations   2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 
Pseudo R-squared 0.238 0.022 0.251 0.257 0.251 0.251 
This table contains the results of estimating the association between credit ratings and the proportion of tier 1 capital 
composed of DTA (equation 2) using ordered logistic regression on the bank holding company sample. Ratingt+1 is the 
bank‟s Standard & Poor credit rating for quarter t+1, where 1 represents the highest rating (AAA) and 22 represents the 
lowest rating (SD or D). DTAPercent is the amount of DTA included in tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. Tier1Ratio is 
the bank‟s tier 1 capital ratio. TotalRatio is the bank‟s total capital ratio. LeverageRatio is the bank‟s leverage ratio. Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. ROAQtr is net income in quarter t scaled by total assets. ROA4Qtr is the sum of net 
income over the previous four quarters over the average total assets during the same period. Liquidity is the sum of cash and 
available-for-sale securities scaled by total assets. Loans is total loans outstanding scaled by total assets. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 months. Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank-quarter 
occurs during the recent recession as defined by the NBER (December 2007 through June 2009), and zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable is the S&P credit rating (Rating). The independent variable of interest is DTAPercent. The dependent 
variable is measured in quarter t+1, and all independent variables are measured in quarter t. Z-statistics reported in 






TABLE 4 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DTA CAPITAL AND BOND SPREADS 
 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign. Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
DTAPercent + 
 
25.686*** 7.920* 6.592 8.277** 8.690** 
  
  
(5.539) (1.989) (1.677) (2.082) (2.168) 
Tier1Ratio ? 22.725*** 
 
19.657** 19.190*** 





  TotalRatio ? 
    
22.017*** 
   
     
(3.247) 
 LeverageRatio ? 
     
26.749*** 
  
      
(2.958) 
Size - 21.020 
 





(1.700) (1.593) (1.344) (1.167) 













   
-85.131*** 
    
    
(-7.814) 
  Liquidity - -1.642* 
 





(-1.198) (-1.084) (-1.670) (-1.021) 
Loans - 1.493* 
 





(1.735) (1.131) (0.895) (-0.612) 
Volatility + 1,380.074*** 
 
1,350.389*** 705.318* 1,259.886** 1,365.637*** 
    (3.000) 
 
(2.876) (1.687) (2.534) (3.108) 
Maturity ? -3.818** 
 
-2.773 -2.210 -2.791 -2.409 
    (-2.162) 
 
(-1.555) (-1.256) (-1.670) (-1.387) 
Coupon + 0.283*** 
 
0.268** 0.255** 0.298*** 0.317*** 
    (2.843) 
 
(2.626) (2.522) (3.246) (3.374) 
Crisis + 211.745*** 
 
198.274*** 189.109*** 200.305*** 191.909*** 
    (10.991) 
 
(10.156) (9.770) (10.249) (9.940) 
Constant   -497.312** 158.508*** -485.139** -344.080* -483.529** -348.762* 
    (-2.263) (13.904) (-2.331) (-1.806) (-2.420) (-1.896) 
Observations   1,002 1,030 1,002 1,002 1,002 1,002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578 0.199 0.591 0.626 0.597 0.598 
This table contains the results of estimating the association between bond spreads and the proportion of tier 1 capital 
composed of DTA (equation 3) using OLS on the bank holding company sample. Spreadt+1 is the difference in the yield from 
the bank‟s outstanding bonds and a risk-free security of equivalent duration. DTAPercent is the amount of DTA included in 
tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 capital ratio. TotalRatio is the bank‟s total capital ratio. 
LeverageRatio is the bank‟s leverage ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROAQtr is net income in quarter t 
scaled by total assets. ROA4Qtr is the sum of net income over the previous four quarters over the average total assets during 
the same period. Liquidity is the sum of cash and available-for-sale securities scaled by total assets. Loans is total loans 
outstanding scaled by total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the prior 60 months. Maturity is 
the time remaining to maturity (measured in years). Coupon is the bond‟s annual coupon rate. Crisis is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the bank-quarter occurs during the recent recession as defined by the NBER (December 2007 through June 
2009), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is the bond spread (Spread). The independent variable of interest is 
DTAPercent. The dependent variable is measured in quarter t+1, and all independent variables are measured in quarter t. t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by bank. *, **, *** represent two-tailed p-values less 




TABLE 5 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DTA CAPITAL, CREDIT RISK, AND 
PROFITABILITY 
 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Sign. Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Ratingt+1 Spreadt+1 Spreadt+1 
DTAPercent + 0.138*** 0.092* 0.149*** 0.074* 17.098*** 10.038** 
  
(3.242) (1.844) (3.288) (1.870) (4.203) (2.402) 
DTAPercent*ROA4Qtr - 0.015 0.035 0.008 0.010 -4.899** -5.563** 
  
(0.795) (1.360) (0.351) (0.534) (-2.158) (-2.612) 
ROA4Qtr - -0.337*** -0.787*** -0.407*** -0.493*** -105.848*** -64.501*** 
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7.261*** 26.615*** 295.418*** -320.900* 
    
(22.576) (4.087) (13.613) (-1.827) 
Observations   2,049 2,049 2,049 2,049 1,030 1,002 
Adj./Pseudo R-squared 0.0349 0.2578 0.131 0.675 0.482 0.633 
This table contains the results of estimating the association between credit ratings and bond spreads and the proportion of tier 
1 capital composed of DTA, conditional on expected profitability (equations 4 and 5) using ordered logistic regression 
(models 1 and 2) and OLS (models 3, 4, 5, and 6) on the bank holding company sample. Ratingt+1 is the bank‟s Standard & 
Poor credit rating for quarter t+1, where 1 represents the highest rating (AAA) and 22 represents the lowest rating (SD or D). 
Spreadt+1 is the difference in the yield from the bank‟s outstanding bonds and a risk-free security of equivalent duration. 
DTAPercent is the amount of DTA included in tier 1 capital divided by tier 1 capital. Tier1Ratio is the bank‟s tier 1 capital 
ratio. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA4Qtr is the sum of net income over the previous four quarters over the 
average total assets during the same period. Liquidity is the sum of cash and available-for-sale securities scaled by total 
assets. Loans is total loans outstanding scaled by total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the 
prior 60 months. Maturity is the time remaining to maturity (measured in years). Coupon is the bond‟s annual coupon rate. 
Crisis is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank-quarter occurs during the recent recession as defined by the NBER 
(December 2007 through June 2009), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in models 1 through 4 is Rating, and the 
dependent variable in models 5 and 6 is Spread. The independent variable of interest is the interaction of DTAPercent and 
ROA4Qtr. The dependent variable is measured in quarter t+1, and all independent variables are measured in quarter t. t-
statistics for OLS regressions (Z-statistics for ordered logistic regressions) reported in parentheses are based on standard 
errors clustered by bank. *, **, *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE 6 – ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CHANGES IN DTA INCLUDED IN CAPITAL AND 
FUTURE RISK OUTCOMES 
 
PANEL A – CHANGE IN FUTURE EQUITY VOLATILITY 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
  Pred. ΔVolatility ΔVolatility ΔVolatility 
VARIABLES Sign. Next Qtr Next 2 Qtr Next Year 
ΔDTAIncluded ? -0.001 -0.001 -0.007* 
  
(-0.328) (-0.347) (-1.753) 
PoorlyCapitalized ? 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  
(1.426) (1.405) (1.146) 
ΔDTAIncluded*PoorlyCapitalized + 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 
  
(3.367) (2.937) (3.560) 
ΔDTAIncluded + ΔDTAIncluded*PoorlyCapitalized   0.010*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES 
Observations   1,744 1,744 1,744 
Adjusted R-squared   0.375 0.457 0.453 
 
PANEL B – CHANGE IN FUTURE NONPERFORMING LOANS 
 
    (1) (2) (3) 
  Pred. ΔNPL ΔNPL ΔNPL 
VARIABLES Sign. Next Qtr Next 2 Qtr Next Year 
ΔDTAIncluded ? -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
  
(-0.773) (-1.372) (-1.060) 
PoorlyCapitalized ? -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
(-0.463) (0.082) (0.028) 
ΔDTAIncluded*PoorlyCapitalized + 0.002 0.008** 0.012** 
  
(1.145) (2.218) (2.282) 
ΔDTAIncluded + ΔDTAIncluded*PoorlyCapitalized   0.001 0.005* 0.010** 
Controls Included?   YES YES YES 
Observations   1,744 1,744 1,744 
Adjusted R-squared   0.187 0.270 0.298 
This table contains the results of estimating the association between future change in risk and the current change in the 
amount of DTA capital included in tier 1 capital (equation 6) using OLS on the bank holding company sample. The 
dependent variable in Panel A is ΔVolatilityt+j, which is defined as Volatility in quarter t+j minus Volatility in quarter t. The 
dependent variable in Panel B is ΔNPLt+j, which is defined as non-performing loans in quarter t+j minus non-performing 
loans in quarter t, scaled by total loans in quarter t. Dependent variables are measured over three different time periods: the 
next quarter, the next two quarters, and the next four quarters. The independent variable of interest is the interaction of 
ΔDTAIncluded (the DTA included in tier 1 capital in the current quarter minus the DTA included in tier 1 capital in the 
previous quarter, scaled by total assets in the previous quarter) and PoorlyCapitalized (indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
bank has a tier 1 ratio in the bottom 30 percent of all banks at the beginning of the quarter and zero otherwise). For brevity, 
only the coefficients on the ΔDTAIncluded, PoorlyCapitalized, and the interaction term are reported. t-statistics are based on 
standard errors clustered by bank. *, **, *** represent two-tailed p-values less than 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
